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MATTHEW H. ORMSBEE* 
Abstract: “Staccato warfare” describes the prevailing characteristic of modern 
American warfare, which features military operations that are increasingly char-
acterized by frequent, disconnected offensives in the battlefield of cyberspace ra-
ther than a physical battlefield. Stakeholders in political and military circles will 
benefit from a better understanding of the President’s cyberattack arsenal as the 
executive branch gradually turns to cyber operations over traditional kinetic op-
tions. Historically, the President’s legal advisers have construed the unilateral 
war powers of the executive branch very broadly, foregoing robust and tradition-
al notions of congressional scrutiny and public review. Nevertheless, staccato 
warfare remains a powerful and lawful tool at the President’s disposal. This Arti-
cle argues that staccato warfare protects the American homeland and is justifiable 
under the President’s noncombat military powers and intelligence activities. 
Staccato warfare achieves vital national security objectives while minimizing the 
risk of spilling American blood and wasting scarce resources. 
INTRODUCTION 
American warfare is now marked by brief, spotty conflicts falling below 
the threshold of war in the constitutional sense. Conflicts take place primarily 
via cyberattacks, unmanned aircraft strikes, and precision special operations. 
This Article focuses on cyberattacks to build on constitutional law principles 
and further the law of war for all stakeholders in contemporary warfare. Mili-
tary commanders will find ample room within the existing statutory and regu-
latory framework for a robust but lawful cyberattack arsenal. 
President Biden stands to be the latest in a long line of American Presi-
dents who construe the unilateral war powers of the executive branch broadly, 
aggressively, and with few meaningful checks. Yet, his administration heralds 
the chance to clarify at least one aspect of presidential war powers: unilateral 
use of cyberattacks by the executive branch to defend vital national interests. 
Cyberattacks, as opposed to traditional use of force, offer perhaps the most 
precise and bespoke tools in the President’s defense toolkit. Still, such attacks 
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are not without risks, especially as they largely evade congressional review and 
public scrutiny. 
This Article argues that modern warfare has evolved to favor short and dis-
crete unilateral attacks, “staccato warfare,” rather than lengthy, all-out wars pit-
ting army against army. Staccato warfare aptly describes the nature of contempo-
rary conflicts, especially in cyberspace where states and non-state parties pursue 
brief and distinct (though never-ending) operations that are unlikely to escalate 
to actual armed conflict. Although largely invisible, staccato warfare is prefera-
ble to traditional war because it risks less bloodshed, defends American interests, 
and comports with constitutional parameters on presidential warfighting. 
I. CYBERATTACKS 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Publication 3-12 defines a 
cyberspace attack in terms of impact: “Cyberspace attack actions create no-
ticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyber-
space or manipulation that leads to denial effects in the physical domains.”1 
The DoD’s definition of a cyberattack expressly excludes cyber operations that 
merely seek to gather information or surveille foreign cyber networks. Instead, 
“denial effects” in the real world are a prerequisite. Because the DoD executes 
cyberattacks but also conducts substantial cyber offensives for information 
gathering, this Article includes in its scope virtually every American cyber ac-
tivity. 
Though the definition of a cyberattack is straightforward, the scope of 
cyberattacks is incredibly vast and diverse. One end of the spectrum features 
routine attacks that tamper with adversaries’ data, for example, while the other 
end of the spectrum includes multistate attacks that can cripple banking or tele-
communications networks with devastating real-world impact. A survey of the 
past few years provides numerous examples of global ransomware attacks that 
have imposed exacting tolls around the world, such as the SolarWinds and Mi-
crosoft Exchange incidents.2 In addition, the United States will feel the effects 
of the 2021 ransomware cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline for years to come.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS II-7 (2018), https://www.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CSS-C8JV]. 
 2 Danny Steed, The United Kingdom’s New Vision of Cyber Power, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 3, 
2021), https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-united-kingdoms-vision-of-cyber-power [https://perma.
cc/N2TG-6DJZ]. 
 3 David E. Sanger, Clifford Krauss, & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattack Forces a Shutdown of a Top 
U.S. Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/us/politics/cyber
attack-colonial-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/M2YJ-UBDD] (“One of the nation’s largest pipelines, 
which carries refined gasoline and jet fuel from Texas up the East Coast to New York, was forced to 
shut down after being hit by ransomware in a vivid demonstration of the vulnerability of energy infra-
structure to cyberattacks.”). 
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With the constant threat of cyberattacks from abroad, the United States re-
lies on its flagship cyberattack program Defend Forward to execute diverse 
low-level cyberattacks on a daily basis.4 Notably, Defend Forward also pos-
sesses capabilities for more aggressive cyberattacks with lasting effects, 
though such capabilities are used far less frequently.5 Opposed to the all-or-
nothing nature of most military intervention, Defend Forward involves a per-
petual level of conflict, in which the United States must maintain continual 
vigilance for attacks on the U.S. Cyber Command’s leader described the use of 
Defend Forward as follows: 
 Cyber Command implements this defend forward strategy through 
the doctrine of persistent engagement. . . . 
 This doctrine of persistent engagement reflects the fact that one-
off cyber operations are unlikely to defeat adversaries. Instead, U.S. 
forces must compete with adversaries on a recurring basis, making it 
far more difficult for them to advance their goals over time.6 
Near-peer competitors will strive for small strategic gains over time 
through staccato warfare campaigns in cyberspace, where ongoing targeted 
campaigns remain below the level of warfare and fall well short of catastrophic 
damage. Instead, discrete attacks on a daily basis seek out chinks in American 
cyber armor that can be exploited. Defending against endless malicious cyber 
activity is a consistent theme across the National Defense Strategy, the Nation-
al Military Strategy, and the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy.7 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Erica D. Borghard, Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to Change 
Adversary Behavior, LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/operationalizing-
defend-forward-how-concept-works-change-adversary-behavior [https://perma.cc/3ZCE-JEGS] (“De-
fend forward . . . entails the proactive observing, pursuing, and countering of adversary operations and 
imposing costs in day-to-day competition to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber 
campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior, using all 
the instruments of national power.”); see also Eric Talbot Jensen & Sean Watts, Due Diligence and 
the U.S. Defend Forward Cyber Strategy, LAWFARE (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
due-diligence-and-us-defend-forward-cyber-strategy [https://perma.cc/J4SE-RR9T] (explaining the 
primarily preemptive nature of the American “Defend Forward” approach to cyber warfare). 
 5 See Borghard, supra note 4.  
 6 Paul M. Nakasone & Michael Sulmeyer, How to Compete in Cyberspace: Cyber Command’s 
New Approach, FOREIGN AFFS. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/Z3ZS-UWVX]; see also Matthew C. Waxman, 
Cyberattacks and the Constitution 13 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 2007, 2020), https://www.
hoover.org/research/cyberattacks-and-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/L7CL-MBED] (quoting Nak-
asone & Sulmeyer, supra). 
 7 Emily O. Goldman, From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplo-
macy, TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV., Fall 2020, at 84, 86, https://tnsr.org/2020/09/from-reaction-to-action-
adopting-a-competitive-posture-in-cyber-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/7B8B-LAUF]. 
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II. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
At the heart of any war powers discussion is the division of authority be-
tween the President and Congress. The authorization of cyberattacks is no dif-
ferent. Although numerous historical arguments exist regarding the constitu-
tional mandate for each political branch to direct military force, these argu-
ments often assume that cyberattacks amount to “war powers.”8 Admittedly, as 
the expected damage of an American cyberattack increases, the likelihood that 
observers will label the cyberattack an exercise of war powers also increases.9 
In addition to the aforementioned constitutional questions, this debate also 
raises statutory questions. In particular, the drafters of the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution (WPR), enacted to rein in lengthy military operations without con-
gressional approval, could not foresee cyberattacks, and the WPR does not ad-
dress them as a possibility. Absent congressional action in the form of an 
amendment, the WPR is not directly applicable to cyberattacks, though it may 
be a persuasive authority.10 
The overwhelming majority of cyberattacks carried out by the United 
States are so insignificant that they could not credibly be construed as an exer-
cise of war powers under the Constitution. Defend Forward, for its part, em-
ploys primarily micro-operations that do not implicate a war powers analysis 
under constitutional law, and generally do not qualify as “use of force” under 
international law. Thus, a war powers analysis of cyberattacks—at least gar-
den-variety attacks carried out by the United States on a daily basis—is inap-
propriate because the war powers framework is ultimately inapplicable. 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Waxman, supra note 6, at 1 (offering an alternative view that the deployment of cyberattacks 
should not automatically be deemed a “war powers issue” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 9 See, e.g., Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 155, 
169 (2010) (describing the risk of “inadvertent escalation” from cyberattacks); Jason Healey & A.J. 
Wilson, Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the 
Fifth Domain, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 59, 62 (noting that the government’s narrow definition of “hostili-
ties” may not appropriately account for cyber activities as “remote war-fighting technology becomes 
ever more capable, reliable, and ubiquitous”); Tyler K. Lowe, Note, Mapping the Matrix: Defining the 
Balance Between Executive Action and Legislative Regulation in the New Battlefield of Cyberspace, 
17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 63, 74 (2015) (delineating between the 
executive authority to use “offensive cyber operations” and “the traditional rules of armed conflict”); 
Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Is the War Powers Clause a Dead Letter in the Cyberspace Age?, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 5, 2013), https://news.yahoo.com/constitution-check-war-powers-clause-dead-
letter-cyberspace-113217808.html [https://perma.cc/Y9YT-L5W2] (highlighting the stark contrast of 
traditional warfare, as understood by the founders and the modern reality of cyber warfare). 
 10 See, e.g., Eric Talbot Jenson, Future War and the War Powers Resolution, 29 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 499, 503 (2015). See generally Oona A. Hathaway, How to Revive Congress’ War Powers, TEX. 
NAT’L SEC. REV. 41 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-war-powers-
resolution/ [https://perma.cc/8XZ4-8KB4] (appearing in Policy Roundtable: The War Powers Resolution, 
a group of legal scholars and practioners gathered to “discuss the War Powers Resolution and what 
should, or should not, be done to improve it”). 
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Executive action for cyberattacks below the war threshold can find more 
ample doctrinal support from other sources of law, such as the President’s non-
combat military powers and intelligence powers. To alleviate concerns about 
unchecked executive power, Congress has played an active role in developing 
U.S. cyber strategy. Members of Congress actively greenlight cyber defense 
measures and more aggressive uses of military cyber operations for certain ad-
versarial states.11 In short, the legislative and executive branches have demon-
strated a successful collaboration to orchestrate cyber military engagements.12 
III. ESCHEWING TRADITIONAL WAR POWERS 
The Founders’ delegation of power to Congress to declare war seems un-
complicated, yet the question soon arose as to whether Congress has full dis-
cretion to decide when the country goes to war. There are certainly reasons to 
argue that Congress does have this authority. In particular, this would ensure 
thorough deliberation over such heavy determinations, preventing rash deci-
sions and ensuring that a single person does not wield war declaration powers. 
Over time, stakeholders formed a consensus around the idea that Congress 
alone should decide when to move the country from peacetime to war. 
Despite this understanding, Presidents have gradually asserted far greater 
authority to employ military force without congressional approval. At times, 
this evolution has occurred with the implied blessing of Congress and the 
courts. “Modern executive-branch legal precedent and practice generally hold 
that the president has broad authority to launch military strikes”—even without 
Congress’s approval, so long the action defends American interests.13 Propo-
nents of unilateral executive action in cyber operations draw parallels to the 
President’s well-established powers to use kinetic military force. Indeed, in 
2020, the DoD’s General Counsel, Paul Ney, argued that the legal analysis for 
cyberattacks mirrors the analysis for kinetic military attacks: 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Robert Chesney, The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations 3 (Hoover 
Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 2003, 2020), https://www.hoover.org/research/domestic-legal-framework-
us-military-cyber-operations [https://perma.cc/R3WB-S43D]. 
 12 Id. at 1 (“Congress and the executive branch have cooperated effectively over the past decade 
to build a legal architecture for military cyber operations.”). 
 13 Waxman, supra note 6, at 3; see, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from Steven A. Engel, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Couns., to the Couns. to the President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syri-
an Chemical-Weapons Facilities 3 (May 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1067551/
download [https://perma.cc/8HMJ-QXJD]; Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Couns., to the Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force 
in Libya 6 (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/2011-04-01-libya-deployment/download 
[https://perma.cc/65QK-P3RM]. 
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The domestic legal authority for the DoD to conduct cyber opera-
tions is included in the broader authorities of the President and the 
Secretary of Defense to conduct military operations in defense of the 
nation. We assess whether a proposed cyber operation has been 
properly authorized using the analysis we apply to all other opera-
tions, including those that constitute use of force.14 
When the executive branch utilizes “military operations in defense of the 
nation” they broach broad and unsettled constitutional boundaries.15 Such opera-
tions tend not to be implicated by the war powers clause. Ney went on to explain 
the legal framework as it applied to the department’s cyber capabilities: 
The President has authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution 
to direct the use of the Armed Forces to serve important national in-
terests, and it is the longstanding view of the Executive Branch that 
this authority may include the use of armed force when the antici-
pated nature, scope, and duration of the operations do not rise to the 
level of “war” under the Constitution, triggering Congress’s power 
to declare war. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long affirmed 
the President’s power to use force in defense of the nation and fed-
eral persons, property, and instrumentalities.16 
Ney concluded that “the President has constitutional authority to order 
military cyber operations even if they amount to use of force” to protect the 
nation.17 There is an argument that a cyberattack becomes an exercise of war 
powers when U.S. Cyber Command executes it, the resulting damages are on 
par with a kinetic strike, and the United States can reasonably expect it to in-
cite armed retaliation.18 But there are more persuasive reasons not to classify 
cyberattacks as uses of war powers, since such powers were originally intend-
ed to address physical violence rather than cyber violence. The exercise of war 
powers is apt partly because of the risk of American bloodshed, but cyberat-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Waxman, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., Dep’t of Def. Gen. Couns., 
Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/News
room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-
conference [https://perma.cc/J479-GBUG]). 
 15 Id. (quoting Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., supra note 14). 
 16 Id. (quoting Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., supra note 14). 
 17 Id. (quoting Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., supra note 14). 
 18 Id. (“Viewing some cyberattacks as the exercise of war powers may seem sensible for several 
reasons. If they are carried out by US Cyber Command, the organization of the armed forces tasked 
with conducting offensive cyber operations, the agent is the same one that conducts kinetic attacks.”). 
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tacks hardly risk American lives. Extreme human remoteness in cyber conflicts 
helps to justify unilateral presidential action.19 
War powers are unique because they require careful consideration for the 
risk of conflict escalation. Thoughtful inter-branch deliberation is vital if ac-
tions are likely to induce militaristic responses. “In recent decades, executive-
branch practice and legal justifications have acknowledged this factor, too, in 
assessing whether a military intervention rises to the level of ‘war’ perhaps 
requiring congressional authorization.”20 In 2018, the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion which justified President Trump’s 
use of air power against Syria. The report noted that the military took measures 
to reduce the likelihood of military reprisals, thereby strengthening the argument 
that the strikes were within presidential authority.21 On the other hand, if 
cyberattacks create a substantial risk of provoking retaliatory violence, then per-
haps congressional approval should be required. 
Additionally, cyberattacks, much like kinetic attacks, can have unintended 
consequences and risk escalation or retaliation.22 It is very unlikely, however, 
that cyberattacks—barring those with catastrophic impact—would risk provok-
ing an armed military response. More probable reactions to cyberattacks in-
clude diplomatic censure, economic sanctions, or counter-cyberattacks. A very 
small percentage of cyberattacks justifiably invoke constitutional war powers, 
even when the recipient state regards the acting state’s cyberattack as a hostile 
military action under international law. 
For those cyberattacks that may qualify as uses of force or armed attacks, 
under the United Nations Charter, the United States has reserved the right to 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 13, at 2–3 (emphasizing that the President selected strike targets in 
Syria that would “minimize collateral damage” (citations omitted)); Memorandum Opinion from Car-
oline D. Krass, supra note 13, at 25 (explaining that the strike zones in Libya specifically targeted 
enemy air bases away from civilian settlements);  
 20 Waxman, supra note 6, at 5. 
 21 Id.; see also Engel, supra note 13, at 21. 
 22 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in 
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-
code-crashed-the-world [https://perma.cc/H5MH-KSUN]; David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up 
Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/
01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html [https://perma.cc/D8JY-
PYAC] (relating to Russian-made malware that targeted Ukrainian servers in 2017 and inadvertently 
spread around the world to devastating effect); Vivian Yeo, Stuxnet Infections Spread to 115 Countries, 
ZDNET (Aug. 9, 2010), https://www.zdnet.com/article/stuxnet-infections-spread-to-115-countries 
[https://perma.cc/NG33-CSDB] (providing an update regarding the spread of the malicious computer 
code that targeted Iranian nuclear plant control systems, widely attributed to U.S. operations, which 
later spread across the globe). See generally BEN BUCHANAN, THE CYBERSECURITY DILEMMA: 
HACKING, TRUST AND FEAR BETWEEN NATIONS (2017) (arguing that cyber operations, regardless of 
their true intent, are often viewed as threatening and malicious by recipient states, thus destabilizing 
relations). 
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respond with kinetic military force.23 Other states similarly take this stance, 
drawing a legal analogy between cyberattacks and kinetic attacks.24 For its 
part, Defend Forward is based around utilizing cyber operations well below 
such levels of severity. Thus, it is unclear why kinetic military attacks should 
be the presumptive analogy for cyberattacks under a constitutional powers 
analysis. The differences between the two forms of attacks are numerous and 
substantial. Ultimately, a war powers analysis is a poor fit for considering the 
lawfulness of cyberattacks. It is unclear whether most cyberattacks should 
alone be considered “hostilities,” thereby implicating the limitations imposed 
by the War Powers Resolution.”25 Including cyberattacks under the war powers 
umbrella is a broad and illogical expansion of constitutional doctrine when 
other constitutional powers are more apt. 
IV. DEFEND FORWARD 
If the legal community accepts that cyberattacks rarely amount to war 
powers, then justification for the power must be found elsewhere in the consti-
tution. While a number of constitutional justifications may be applicable, U.S. 
cyberattacks should most commonly be categorized similarly to noncombat 
military powers and intelligence powers.26 
“Defend Forward involves proactively countering malicious adversary 
cyber campaigns through day-to-day competition. Defend Forward aims to 
disrupt adversary cyber operations, deter future campaigns.”27 Per the 2018 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Cyber Strategy & Policy: International Law Dimensions: Testimony Before the S. Armed 
Forces Comm., 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Matthew C. Waxman, Professor of Law, Colum-
bia Law School). 
 24 See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 
2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 431 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Noteworthy Releases of International 
Cyber Law Positions—Part I: NATO, Posting to Articles of War, LIEBER INST. W. POINT (Aug. 27, 
2020), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/nato-release-international-cyber-law-positions-part-i [https://
perma.cc/VL6E-4M5J]. 
 25 In the 2011 Libya intervention, the Obama Administration argued that “hostilities” did not arise 
because the exposure of U.S. military forces, risk of escalation, and military means were all limited. 
See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 58 
(2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State); see also Waxman, supra note 
24, at 434–35 (reasoning why cyberattacks should not be equated with physical, armed military 
strikes). 
 26 See Gary P. Corn, Cyber National Security: Navigating Gray-Zone Challenges in and Through 
Cyberspace, in COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
MODERN WARFARE 367 (Christopher M. Ford & Winston S. Williams eds., 2019) (clarifying that for 
many U.S. cyber operations, “the scope of the president’s authority is more nuanced as it implicates 
the full range of Article II authority, not just the commander-in-chief power, and is further complicat-
ed by the novelty and uncertainties surrounding the use of cyber operations as a tool of national pow-
er”); see also Waxman, supra note 6, at 7. 
 27 Waxman, supra note 6, at 8; see also Borghard, supra note 4. 
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DoD Cyber Strategy: the DoD “will defend forward to disrupt or halt mali-
cious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of 
armed conflict.”28 
The vast majority of Defend Forward operations do not meet the thresh-
old necessary to be considered “cyberattacks” under the definition adopted by 
the DoD. Defend Forward operations include penetrating to foreign networks, 
collecting data, and creating groundwork for other potential operations. Cer-
tainly, some of Defend Forward actions are properly classified as cyberattacks. 
These might include interrupting communications from an adversary military 
facility used to infiltrate U.S. military command and control systems, inserting 
malware that deletes or encrypts data on servers engaged in malign foreign 
influence campaigns online, or denying service to networks used by adversary 
intelligence agencies to conduct industrial espionage.”29 Such operations in-
volve combinations of at least two constitutional powers.30 
A. Noncombat Military Powers 
Cyberattacks and operations carried out by U.S. military agencies should 
be viewed presumptively as noncombat military activities, thus constitutionally 
authorized as a power reserved to the executive branch, though falling short of 
the hostile application of armed force. As the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, the President has authority to engage U.S. military forces in 
training exercises to prepare for conflict.31 Historically, the executive branch 
has viewed its authority broadly in this respect, notably ordering American 
pilots to train British pilots at U.S. facilities in 1941. At that time, the U.S. At-
torney General opined: 
[T]he president “has supreme command over the land and naval 
forces of the country and may order them to perform such military 
duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or appropriate for the defense 
of the United States. These powers exist in time of peace as well as 
in time of war.”32 
                                                                                                                           
 28 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 1 (2018), https://
media.defense.gov/2018/sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/cyber_strategy_summary_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UU7B-7SY7]. 
 29 Waxman, supra note 6, at 8. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS 
THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 15–16 (1981) (listing the hypothetical military scenarios that 
require joint authorization or action from the President and Congress). 
 32 Waxman, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 
40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 61 (1941)). 
I.-10 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 63:E. Supp. 
Thus, Defend Forward’s use of cyberattacks against foreign systems as a 
proactive measure to thwart enemy invasions into American intelligence net-
works resembles the British improving their pilot program to undercut the 
prowess of Germany’s air force in World War II.33 In both cases, the adver-
sary’s capabilities are degraded without kinetic strikes or actual physical de-
struction. In fact, the vast majority of cyberattacks, even outside the scope of 
Defend Forward, could be viewed as an exercise of the President’s noncombat 
military powers. A prominent example is the 2019 U.S. cyber operation that 
destroyed Iranian information systems used to target ships.34 Such efforts are 
primarily prophylactic and aimed at general deterrence or thwarting specific 
future attacks. 
Finally, Congress reserves the right to limit executive authority with re-
spect to war powers. The executive branch has broad discretion as Commander 
in Chief but legally must stay within statutory restrictions. To that point, Con-
gress regulates the extent to which the U.S. military trains and equips foreign 
forces. Legislative tools such as appropriation of funds, limit the President’s au-
thority.35 Historically, Congress has imposed various limitations on the executive 
branch deploying troops abroad during peacetime.36 Yet, while Congress could 
legislate to restrict military cyber activities, to date it has not done so. 
B. Intelligence Activities 
Another conduit for cyberattacks via Defend Forward is the President’s 
intelligence powers under the Constitution.37 National security concerns 
somewhat cloud this area of constitutional law, regrettably precluding the de-
gree of public analysis of government action that typically accompanies war-
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time action. The President has historically argued for broad discretion under 
the intelligence powers, citing the President’s authority in the realm of foreign 
relations, in combination with the Commander in Chief’s authority. According-
ly, the President has claimed robust intelligence authority to undercut adver-
saries’ militaries and state organs. Cyber efforts to collect information fit 
cleanly within the President’s intelligence powers, while more disruptive of-
fensives require closer analysis. 
On occasion, the executive branch has asserted that the President’s intel-
ligence powers include control over electronic surveillance, signals intelli-
gence, “quasi-military activities such as paramilitary support to proxy groups or 
physical sabotage operations, as well as propaganda campaigns and other politi-
cal manipulation.”38 Further removed activities include propaganda campaigns 
and other manipulation efforts when the United States government can reason-
ably deny any responsibility or involvement.39 It is unclear whether certain 
intelligence activities, especially when they include physical violence, aptly 
fall within war powers or another constitutional category. 
Congress has played an active role, regulating intelligence activities 
through procedural and reporting requirements.40 Oversight statutes can be 
viewed either as a recognition and limitation on the President’s intelligence 
powers or as an implicit authorization of the President to conduct covert intel-
ligence activities without specific congressional approval. Ultimately, the cur-
rent framework does not require the President to seek formal approval for each 
operation, but must meet congressionally imposed limitations.41 
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Cyberattacks pursued under Defend Forward can be constitutionally 
based in the intelligence powers, since the method of cyberattacks (secret in-
cursion to foreign networks) is primarily an intelligence activity.42 Even more 
damaging cyber operations that alter data or input malware are analogous to 
“black bag jobs” that secretly aid “proxy paramilitary forces,” a common tactic 
deployed by American intelligence groups. This type of attack differs from 
Stuxnet––a cyber mission that wrought notable, concrete damage to strategi-
cally significant military sites––which appears more like an “exercise of war 
powers.”43 Still, such operations are similar to past operations undertaken pur-
suant to intelligence powers. Such intelligence operations tend to be treated as 
a different constitutional category.44 
CONCLUSION 
Military lawyers and commanders must not reflexively categorize 
cyberattacks as exercises of war powers, except in rare circumstances. More 
commonly, the American doctrine of “persistent engagement” in cyberspace 
fits cleanly in the constitutional categories of noncombat military powers and 
intelligence powers. While the President may wield extraordinary power as the 
Commander in Chief of U.S. cyber warfare, Congress should maintain its ac-
tive engagement in shaping U.S. cyber strategy, encouraging assertive cyber 
operations against certain adversaries.45 Staccato warfare will continue to 
characterize modern warfare, requiring constant agility against adversaries as 
the United States competes at levels just below that of armed conflict and de-
flects malicious cyberattacks on a daily basis. 
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